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Abstract:
Unemployment is considered a significant driver behind the so-called Arab Spring, and more generally be-
hind protests, rebellions, and civil wars. However, the empirical evidence of this hypothesised link between
unemployment and political instability is scant and contradictory. This article contributes to filling this gap.
In addition, this is the first study which will concentrate on the role of unemployment in the case of the Arab
Spring uprisings. The study utilises regression analysis and several survey data sets. The results show that
compared to the employed, the unemployed are not more likely to have participated in the Arab Spring un-
rests or protests in the Arab world in general. Further analyses reveal that, as expected, the unemployed are
less satisfied with life and not particularly interested in politics. In turn, being dissatisfied with life does not
influence the likelihood that an individual revolts, but those interested in politics are considerably more active
protesters. Taken together, the results indicate that the Arab unemployed were unhappy, but due to their low
interest in politics this dissatisfaction did not drive them to the streets. These findings togetherwith some earlier
results from different corners of the world suggest that the linkage of unemployment and political instability
is remarkably weaker than often assumed.
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1 Introduction
In December 2010 in a Tunisian provincial town, the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to
protest against the actions of corrupted police. This event sparked unrests which also erupted in the capital Tu-
nis, and soon unseated president Ben Ali. Revolts inspired by the peaceful revolution in Tunisia rolled through
most of the Arab world in 2011. These uprisings that came to be known as the Arab Spring toppled several
rulers who had governed for decades, but they also sparked brutal civil wars. Although mostly what is consid-
ered as the Arab Spring occurred in 2011, its impact is clearly evident still today. The war in Syria has continued
for more than 8 years and caused reportedly over 500,000 fatalities. There are ongoing civil wars also in Yemen
and Libya, and there is much turbulence and insecurity elsewhere in the region.
Unemployment is often nominated as a driver behind these uprisings, and the Arab Spring was not the first
time that unemployment has been blamed for riots in the region (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011, pp. 4–6; Sadiki,
2000). Also outside the Arab world, unemployment is commonly seen as a factor which considerably increases
the likelihood of various forms of political instability from protesting and rioting to terrorism and civil wars.
As it is assumed that unemployment causes political instability, this is then followed by assuming that creating
employment is a way to foster peace (Berman, Callen, Felter, & Shapiro, 2011, p. 497). However, there is hardly
any empirical evidence to confirm either the link between unemployment and political instability or the link
between job creation and increased stability (Cramer, 2011; Holmes, McCord, Hagen-Zanker, Bergh, & Zanker,
2013). Nor has, in the case of the Arab Spring, the role of unemployment been studied thoroughly. This study
aims at filling this gap. The article will primarily focus on the specific case of the Arab Spring, but it will also
analyse the relationship between unemployment and protest in the Arab countries more generally.
To understand its potential role behind the rebellions in the Arabworld, a few notions about unemployment
in the region are worth making. Figure 1 shows that unemployment in the Arab world is substantial compared
to theworld average. Notably, however, the Arab countries as awhole did not see the increase in unemployment
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after the 2008 financial crisis. Actually, in 2010, on the eve of the Arab Spring, the average of the unemployment
rates of the Arab countries was at the lowest level since 1991.
Figure 1: Unemployment rates in the Arab world, the European Union, and globally 1991–2018.
In the Arab world, three groups especially suffered from high unemployment rates: the youth, the educated
and women. A higher unemployment rate among the youth is not uncommon. As Figure 1 shows, the young
were unemployed more often also elsewhere. In many Arab countries, unemployment rates among the highly
educated were higher compared to those with lower education levels. This, in turn, was a unique situation in
the world (Chaaban, 2010, pp. 18–20; Goldstone, 2011, p. 12; Mirkin, 2013, p. 24; World Bank, 2019).
Figure 2 shows the unemployment rates in the Arab countries prior to the eruption of the Arab Spring. The
unemployment rates presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are taken from the data collected by the International
Labour Organization. This data is mainly based on labour force surveys. There are certainly some inaccuracies
in it but they do not affect the overall picture of Figure 2; the Arab countries were very heterogeneous in terms
of unemployment when the Arab Spring started. Where many Arab countries faced significant problems in
providing employment opportunities for their citizens, there has been a lot of labour migration to oil exporting
Gulf countries (Mirkin, 2013, p. 17).
Figure 2: Unemployment rates in the Arab League member countries in 2010.
The Arab Spring has been seen as an outcome of various factors; high unemployment, a large share of the
youth population, autocratic and bad governance, human right violations, increased food prices, an increase in
educational attainment, social media, a state dominated economic system, and oil. Unemployment is maybe the
most often mentioned of these factors (see for example Allansson, Baumann, Taub, Themnér, & Wallensteen,
2012; Campante & Chor, 2012; Gelvin, 2012; Goldstone, 2011; Hoffman& Jamal, 2012; Malik &Awadallah, 2013;
Mirkin, 2013; Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011).
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Some have seen the relationship between unemployment and the Arab Spring clearly as causal: the Interna-
tional LabourOrganization (2011) titled its analysis straightforwardly “Youth unemployment in theArabworld
is a major cause for rebellion.” Some have been more cautious in their wording. Malik and Awadallah (2013, p.
296) posed that “Arab revolutions were fueled by poverty, unemployment and lack of economic opportunity.”
The linkage has also been promoted in mass media, for example in an article by The Guardian (2011) “The
frustrated generation at the heart of the protests tell how their progress is being stifled by unemployment and
corruption.”
The relationship between unemployment and the Arab Spring is seldom analysed more closely; still, some
have done slightly more than just mentioned it. The results of Campante and Chor (2012) indicate that people
aremorewilling to protest in countries with high unemployment and a rapid increase in years of schooling, and
most Arab countries appeared in this group of countries. Byun and Hollander (2015) find that unemployment
did not have a significant impact on the level of unrest a country faced during the Arab Spring.
Some studies have, based on different survey data sets, analysed drivers of individual level protest participa-
tion. Doherty and Schraeder (2015) study Tunisia and find that there were no statistically significant differences
between the unemployed and the employed as to how often they took part in protests before the ousting of Ben
Ali and in protests after elections. Shafiq and Vignoles (2015) note that “perhaps surprisingly” their descriptive
data do not show that the unemployed would have been more likely to protest.
Utilising the first wave of the Arab Barometer survey, Hoffman and Jamal (2012, pp. 181–184) report that –
“[c]ontrary to what might be expected” – being unemployed lowers the likelihood for an individual to protest.
Beissinger, Jamal, & Mazur (2012, p. 13) as well as Hoffman and Jamal (2014, pp. 599, 603–604) have studied
protest participation in Tunisia and Egypt based on the second wave of the Arab Barometer. Both studies find
that unemployment was not a statistically significant predictor of participation in the Arab Spring insurgencies
in either country. Taken together, this existing research provides amixed picture about the relationship between
unemployment and the Arab Spring.
This article contributes to the existing research in many ways. The above-mentioned studies have made
some observations about unemployment and the Arab Spring. However, in these studies, unemployment has
been one factor among others in regression analyses, or it has otherwise received minor attention. The arti-
cles that have analysed individual level participation, have mostly studied just Tunisia or Tunisia and Egypt
(Beissinger et al., 2012; Doherty & Schraeder, 2015; Hoffman & Jamal, 2014; Shafiq & Vignoles, 2015). In addi-
tion, earlier studies have often modelled participation in the Arab Spring based on some other protests, they
have not discussed further their scattered findings about unemployment or the inspection of the participation
of the unemployed has been descriptive.
Even though unemployment is a difficult concept in the developing economies, previous studies have not
paid much attention to how to operationalise it. For example, Hoffman and Jamal (2012) have counted all those
who have not reported being employed as unemployed. Thus, they have counted also the retired, housewives,
and students as “unemployed,” which is apparently an imperfect solution. Here I will put more emphasis on
tackling the problem of measuring unemployment in the Arab world. I also pay special attention to the young
unemployed and the educated unemployed. This has not been done previously. To my knowledge, there are no
prior studies that would have analysed the relationship of the unemployed and the Arab Spring as thoroughly
as I will do. Further, as will be pointed out, there is in general surprisingly little research on the relationship
between unemployment and political instability. This scarcity highlights the importance of this paper as one
new empirical case study about the struggles of the unemployed.
2 Literature survey andhypotheses
TheArab Springmanifested itself in various forms of political instability, thus it is relevant to survey the connec-
tion of unemployment both to protesting and to organised violence. There are twomain theoretical approaches
suggesting that unemployment increases the likelihood of political instability. The first of these two is economic
and it is often traced back to Becker (1968) who studied crimes. Later Grossman (1991) and Collier and Hoef-
fler (1998), among others, have promoted the economic approach and applied it to conflicts. The assumption
is that individuals take part in collective acts of violence because of material inducements. When options for
non-violent employment are scarce, soldieringmight offer people alluring opportunities to earnmoney. Conse-
quently, high unemployment rates can fuel conflicts by facilitating the recruitment of rebels. Further, Lichbach
(1995, p. 342) argues that the unemployed will participate also in protests more probably because they face no
opportunity-costs from losing time at paid work.
The second prominent approach is relative deprivation theory which has been more in favour of social
psychologists. According to Gurr (1970), an influential contributor to the theory, relative deprivation is expe-
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rienced by those whose actual circumstances and commodities do not equal what they expected to gain and
what they think they are rightfully entitled to. The individual’s perception of deprivation is important, people
whose expectations are not met can feel themselves deprived even if an “objective” outsider would consider
otherwise. The relatively deprived use political violence to struggle against their situation. Scholars of social
movements have linked relative deprivation also with protesting; those relatively deprived protest to redress
the deprivation they face (Klandermans, 2011, pp. 40–42).
However, various arguments challenge this assumed positive linkage between unemployment and political
instability. First, stigmatisation has been considered one of themost important obstacles for the collective action
of the unemployed (Perry & Reiss, 2011, p. 32). If public opinion and elected officials consider unemployment
to be a personal fault of an individual, the insurgence of the unemployed lacks legitimacy (Chabanet & Faniel,
2011, pp. 392–393).
Second, to think that the employed are wealthy and happy and the unemployed are deprived and unhappy
might be a simplistic and a Western mindset. Cramer (2011, p. 17) reminds that globally there are millions of
people whose working conditions are “so dreadful that it is probably no more difficult to recruit [rebels and
soldiers] among them” than among the unemployed. There are also some issues related to the concept of being
unemployed. The definition of unemployment requires that an individual is looking for work. In the developing
economies, people are maybe not looking for work because they consider seeking work by conventional means
useless if the informal economy and self-employment offer the major employment opportunities (World Bank,
2019). In the Arab world more than 10% of the employed work in the informal sector (Chaaban, 2010, p. 18).
Another issue is that in the developing countries statewelfare benefits aremostly scant or non-existent so people
cannot afford to be unemployed in the sense understood in the West (Cramer, 2011, p. 15).
Third, the unemployed are a socially heterogeneous group, and many of them want to get rid of being
unemployed. Both these factors hinder the formation of a collective identity which is important in collective
action such as protesting (Chabanet & Faniel, 2011, p. 394; Klandermans, 2011, p. 46).
Fourth, social movements are never spontaneous events (Chabanet & Faniel, 2011, p. 397). Although the
Arab Spring revolts have been labelled spontaneous from time to time, Gelvin (2012, pp. 54–55) reminds how
the April 6 Movement among other organisations was coordinating the Egyptian uprisings. The movement, for
example, organised twenty-onemarches to Tahrir Square because a single march could easily have been broken
by the security forces.
Fifth, the unemployed lack resources such as money, political skills, leadership, organisational resources,
and social networks which are necessary for mobilising a protest (Klandermans, 2011, pp. 45–46; Schlozman &
Verba, 1979, pp. 12–20).
Further, protests do not provide employment opportunities to the protesters (Klandermans, 2011, p. 55).
The rational unemployed can thus be expected to devote their time and skills to finding work rather than to
protesting (Schlozman & Verba, 1979, p. 351). This so-called free rider problem is not less notable in the case of
authoritarian Arab states where rioting is indeed risky.
The contention of the economic approach that money is an essential motive for an individual to join groups
that use violence is also challenged. For example, people have given manifold motivations for joining the
Colombian guerrilla movement FARC: the allure ofmilitary life, getting a gun, personal problems, the boredom
and miseries of daily life, sexual harassment at home, the wish to get training and an education, and political
ideologies (Gutierréz-Sanín, 2008, pp. 14, 17, 20–25).
Last, if insurgence is considered something people do by choice, people possibly start fighting when their
basic needs are filled. This rather suggests that an improved economic situation would lead to higher levels
of violence at the same time that it leads to lower levels of unemployment (Berman et al., 2011, pp. 497–498).
Similarly, Klandermans (2011, p. 46) suggests that those who protest are maybe not the poor and the powerless
but those who are slightly better off.
2.1 Empirical evidence
The relationship between unemployment and protesting has gained interest for a long time. In the early 1930s
a path-breaking study of Marienthal, an Austrian village of extreme unemployment, concluded that the un-
employed were passive and desperate and that particularly their political interest and activity were very low
(Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, Zeisel, & Fleck, 1933/2002). Some case studies from Germany and the United Kingdom
during the 1930s extrapolated similarly and thus, for a long time scholars took for granted that unemployment
leads to exclusion and apathy (Baglioni, Baumgarten, Chabanet, & Lahusen, 2010, p. 324; Perry & Reiss, 2011,
pp. 3–6). More recently, Reiss and Perry (2011) have shown that the unemployed have still protested in various
countries and with varying levels of intensity during the two last centuries. Lahusen (2013) states that protests
by the unemployed in Sweden, France, andGermany illustrate that collective protest actions by the unemployed
are much more common than assumed in the earlier studies.
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By contrast, Giugni (2008) and Baglioni et al. (2010) have studied the mobilisation and protests of the un-
employed in different European countries and discovered that their actions are in general sporadic or even
marginal, and further that participation among the unemployed is rather low compared to, for example, peace
and ecology activists. Olzak, Shanahan, andMcEneaney (1996) find that neither the unemployment rate nor an
addition of a change in the unemployment rate had any effect on the rate of race riots in the United States from
1960 to 1993. Later Olzak and Shanahan (1996) introduce some evidence that higher unemployment rates for
black people and, taken especially together with increased black migration, were connected to an increase in
racial riots.
Most of the studies of protesting and unemployment concentrate on Western countries, making two stud-
ies from Nigeria interesting. Based on different data, they both observe that respondents with paying jobs are
more willing to take part in violent demonstrations than the unemployed (Oyefusi, 2010; Scacco, 2007). The re-
lationship between unemployment and peaceful protest is also negative, but statistically insignificant (Oyefusi,
2010).
To sum, despite diverse conclusions from this earlier research, there is very little evidence to show that
the unemployed are active rioters. Even less have I become convinced that the unemployed would be active
protesters compared to the employed. Rather the evidence seems to run in an opposite direction; although un-
employment has led to unrest this happens sporadically and, generally, the protests of the unemployed appear
to be rare.
The evidence is no more concordant in the case of unemployment and organised violence. Some studies
indicate a positive relationship between the two, some suggest no relationship, and some studies have found,
maybe most interestingly, a negative relationship: the more unemployment, the less violence.
In his review, Cramer (2011, p. 24) concluded that “There is no remotely convincing evidence at the cross-
country, large-N level, at the quantitative case study level, or at the ethnographic, ‘qualitative’ level, for any
bold claims that unemployment is a mechanistic causal factor in violent conflicts in developing countries. The
evidence on youth unemployment is even weaker.”
Some case studies have found that the unemployed are eager to start rebelling. In a study, half of the in-
terviewed al-Shabaab fighters were unemployed when they were recruited and the rest had low-income jobs
(Botha & Abdile, 2014, pp. 7–8). Similarly, among the youth of the Nigerian delta, being unemployed increased
the individual’s likelihood to be willing to take part in an armed struggle. But interestingly, if also adult re-
spondents were included in the analysis, being unemployed, in turn, lowered the likelihood that a respondent
wants to take up arms (Oyefusi, 2010). Based on two data sets, Gutierréz-Sanín (2008, pp. 17–18) finds that most
of the FARC fighters were working before joining the group. In the other data set “not one declared” to have
been unemployed. Many studies have found that unemployment has rather a slender effect. Studying young
people in Afghanistan, Columbia, and Somalia, Proctor (2015) finds no relationship between their unemploy-
ment and their support for or willingness to engage in political violence. Those who travelled from Finland to
conflict zones in Syria considered an anti-Muslim atmosphere themost central reason for leaving; they had had
varying employment and socio-economic situations (Creutz, 2015).
As one approach is to study participation at the individual level as above, another way is to study temporal
and regional relations. Berman et al. (2011) find that in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines higher unemploy-
ment rates predict a lower intensity of insurgent attacks against government forces and their allies. In the same
way, in Northern Ireland, White (1993, pp. 580–582) and Thompson (1989) have both found that depending on
model specifications and what exactly is measured, a higher unemployment rate either is not connected to the
level of political violence or is connected to a lower level of violence. By contrast, using imputed data of Catholic
and Protestant unemployment rates in Northern Ireland, Honaker (2010) finds that the level of violence target-
ing civilians rises as the unemployment rate rises. Studying 24 developing countries, Azeng and Yogo (2013)
report that higher youth unemployment rates are connected to higher likelihood of internal conflict.
As a conclusion of the above-presented and other empirical research I have read, the diversity both in re-
sults and in methods is considerable. Further, almost all studies are case studies of one or a few countries,
or in some situations collections or reviews of case studies. Often the sample sizes are relatively small. And
in many cases, the findings presented are drawn from studies which do not focus on unemployment. I have
found no systematic global scale study about the relationship between unemployment and protesting nor be-
tween unemployment and organised violence – compared to, for example, a study by Buhaug, Cederman, and
Gleditsch (2014) of civil wars, inequalities, and ethnicity which covered all independent states of the world and
a timespan from 1960 to 2005.
2.2 Hypotheses
All hypotheses will be studied in the context of the Arab Spring and the Arab countries.
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Hypothesis 1. The unemployed are more likely to protest than the employed.
Hypothesis 2. The young unemployed are more likely to protest than the young employed.
Hypothesis 3. The educated unemployed are more likely to protest than the educated employed.
As discussed above, relative deprivation theory and the economic approach both let us assume that the un-
employed are more likely to protest. For hypothesis 2 which concerns young people, there are both state level
and individual level bases. There is evidence that countries experiencing exceptionally large youth cohorts,
so-called “youth bulges,” have a higher risk of riots or violent demonstrations, domestic armed conflict and
terrorism (Urdal, 2006). At the individual level, young age is a factor increasing significantly the likelihood to
take part in a protest, both violent and peaceful (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012, p. 184; Oyefusi, 2010, pp. 334, 337).
A higher level of education predicts a higher level of participation in various kinds of political activities,
ranging from discussing politics to taking part in demonstrations (Campante & Chor, 2012, p. 168). In hypothe-
sis 3, as in hypothesis 2, we thus search for a joint effect, this time for unemployment and education. Following
relative deprivation theory, we also expect high participation in insurgencies among the highly educated un-
employed. Those who educate themselves probably have higher expectations for life. When these expectations
are not met and the educated remain unemployed, we can assume that they become deprived, frustrated and
eager to take to the streets.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 also have grounds related to the particular case of the Arab Spring. It has been stated
that the youngwere “at the forefront” in the uprisings (Bjorvatn &Høigilt, 2016) and that it was especially youth
unemployment which sparked the Arab Spring (Hoffman& Jamal, 2012, p. 168; International Labour Organiza-
tion, 2011; Mirkin, 2013, p. 7). As noted above, in addition to the youth, in many Arab countries unemployment
affected especially the highly educated. Campante and Chor (2012) suggested that it was specifically the com-
bination of high unemployment and an increase in education which resulted in the onset of the Arab Spring.
Hypothesis 4. The unemployed are less satisfied with their lives than the employed.
Hypothesis 5. The unemployed are less interested in politics than the employed.
Hypothesis 6. People who are less satisfied with their lives are more likely to protest.
Hypothesis 7. People who are more interested in politics are more likely to protest.
Hypotheses 4–7 study mechanisms that determine whether the unemployed participate in the protests. Two
factors are studiedmore closely, satisfactionwith life and interest in politics. Satisfaction with life is an essential
theme in relative deprivation theory. As discussed earlier, being unemployed can reduce people’s interest in
politics and political activity (Jahoda et al., 1933/2002). On the other hand, political skills are assumed to be a
critical resource in the process of mobilisation (Klandermans, 2011, pp. 45–46; Schlozman & Verba, 1979, pp.
12–20).
The unemployed are compared with the employed instead of comparing the unemployed to all other re-
spondents. This is done becausewe expect that unemployed peoplewould calmdown if theywould get jobs. Or
if seen from the perspective of relative deprivation theory, the unemployed feel deprived because they compare
themselves with the employed.
3 Data,methods, andmeasurements
Used data sets are the third wave of the Arab Barometer (referred to as ABIII) and the sixth wave of the World
Values Survey (WVS6). In total ABIII has over 14,000 respondents from twelve different Arab countries. From
WVS6, eight Arab countries and their roughly 10,000 respondents are included. Later, when I refer to “all
countries” of WVS6, this always stands for all these eight analysedArab countries of WVS6. Following the most
common definition, I consider the member states of the Arab League to be Arab countries. The data sets rep-
resent adults 18 years old and older in each country. Table 1 presents the countries included in the analyses
and those Arab countries of WVS6 which are excluded because some questions were not asked. The table also
shows when the interviews have been conducted in these countries.
The article mainly studies all Arab countries inwhich there is data as one sample. To supplement the picture
of the mobilisation of the unemployed, hypothesis 1 is also studied in some individual countries and country
groups. There could be country-specific differences in the participation of the unemployed because, for exam-
ple, labour unions play a role in protest mobilisation and they have different relationships to the unemployed
in different countries (Chabanet & Faniel, 2011, pp. 398–404). It is also suggested that in different Arab Spring
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countries different socio-economic groups mobilised the rebellions (Anderson, 2011, p. 2). Because the arti-
cle has a special focus on the Arab Spring, the individually studied countries are Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and
Yemen. According to Allansson et al. (2012), p. 46 these countries were hardest hit by the uprisings together
with Bahrain and Syria, from the two last-mentioned countries there is no data.
Table 1: Included and excluded countries in the analyses and field periods in each country.
ABIII data WVS6 data
Algeria Included 3/2013–4/2013 Included 1/2014–10/2014
Egypt Included 3/2013–4/2013 Excluded
Iraq Included 6/2013 Included 11/2013–12/2013
Jordan Included 12/2012–1/2013 Included 2/2014–3/2014
Kuwait Included 2/2014–3/2014 Excluded
Lebanon Included 6/2013 Included 11/2013
Libya Included 3/2013–4/2013 Included 1/2014–2/2014
Morocco Included 4/2013–6/2013,
3/2014
Included 5/2011–6/2011
Palestine Included 12/2012 Excluded
Qatar No data Excluded
Sudan Included 4/2013–5/2013 No data
Tunisia Included 2/2013 Included 11/2013–12/2013
Yemen Included 11/2013–12/2013 Included 2/2014
Linear regression – and more precisely linear ordinary least squares regression – is used with hypotheses 4
and 5. In other cases, binary logistic regression is applied. Some assumptions related to the use of regression are
worth discussing here. The independence of observations is an assumption in all regression analysis. It should
not cause concern in this study as the observations here are single respondents interviewed separately. A source
of debate is the use of Likert scale variables in a linear regression model. In all my linear regression models
the explained variable is a Likert scaled question or a combination of two Likert scaled questions. Following
Vehkalahti (2008, p. 37) andNewsom (2013, p. 2) I consider that the use of Likert scale variables is justified here.
Lumley, Diehr, Emerson, and Chen (2002) argue that it “is widely but incorrectly believed” that linear re-
gression would be valid only with normally distributed explained variables. Some previous studies have found
that the normality condition loses its significance with sample sizes of some 100 observations, and Lumley et
al. conclude that 500 is enough even with an extremely non-normal data. Here all explained variables of linear
regression models are not normally distributed. However, the sample sizes are above 9,000, so this should not
be a problem.
To tackle the challenge of measuring unemployment in developing economies I will use three ways to op-
erationalise unemployment. First, I will simply utilise questions in which the respondents themselves report
their employment status (q1005 and q1006 in ABIII, V229 in WVS6). The options given differ slightly between
ABIII andWVS6, but both surveys offer options of being “unemployed” andworking “full-time,” i.e. 30 hours a
week or more. Those respondents who answer that they are unemployed will obviously form the group under
scrutiny, the unemployed. In my analyses, those whowork full-time constitute the group of employed. Respon-
dents can also have chosen to be part-time employed, self-employed, retired, housewife, and student. All these
respondents who are neither full-time workers nor unemployed will be grouped as having other employment
status. Part-time workers are classified as having other employment status because it is unknown whether they
work one hour or 29 hours a week. Categorising them as employed or unemployed would, either way, disturb
the analysis. This division of respondents into three groups is coded by two separate binary variables. In the
“Employed” variable the employed are coded as 1 and all the rest of the respondents as 0. In the “Others”
variable respondents with other employment status are coded as 1 and unemployed and employed respondents
as 0.
Because the unemployed are coded as 0 in both variables, they form the reference category. Consequently,
the “Employed” variable will enable us to compare the employed with the unemployed (Long, Long, & Freese,
2006, pp. 417–418). We are not interested in comparing the unemployed and the “Others” group because the
“Others” group is so heterogeneous. It would have been possible to exclude respondents with any other em-
ployment status than employed or unemployed but including “Others” increases the sample size. Bigger sam-
ple size in turn means that the control variables are better adjusted.
As argued earlier, the nature of labour markets in the Arab world challenges the definition of being unem-
ployed. Robbins, project director of the Arab Barometer, assumes that some respondents who are not currently
working might still have answered that they work when they mean that they work in general. This can particu-
larly be the case with those working in the informal sector (Robbins, 2014). Thus, there can be some bias in this
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measure of unemployment as the responses to this question may not fully reflect the formal definition of un-
employment. To handle these issues, I also use income as a proxy for employment. Since most people arguably
get most of their money from work it is reasonable to assume that people who are mostly unemployed have a
low income.
I use twoways to measure incomewhich I call absolute income and relative income. These are the two other
operationalisations of unemployment. In WVS6, respondents are asked (v239) to specify themselves in which
of the ten shown income group they belong. In ABIII I have calculated the income groups myself based on the
monthly income of the respondents (q1014). I have divided all respondents in each country into ten groups
so that the groups are as equal in size as possible. The respondents of both ABIII and WVS6 are coded so that
those in group 1 have the lowest income and those in group 10 the highest incomewithin a country. For various
reasons, these questions about absolute income do not necessarily tell whether the respondents’ income covers
their needs; for example, there are differences in price levels within countries. In ABIII the relative income is
based on question (q1016) where respondents are asked about the sufficiency of their household income. Those
facing significant difficulties in meeting their needs are coded as 1 and at the opposite end respondents able
to save as 4. In WVS6 there is no question to measure relative income. In analyses of relative and absolute
income only those respondents are included who have to the employment status question answered that they
are unemployed, part-time employed, full-time employed, or self-employed.
In ABIII, respondents are asked (q800a) whether they in 2011 and 2012 had participated in demonstrations
and rallies to which the Arab Spring led. Following from this wording in ABIII the article concentrates in the
Arab Spring related protests in years 2011 and 2012. WVS6 provides information on whether respondents have
during the last year attended peaceful demonstrations (v87 and v92). This is coded as a binary variable where
1 is for respondents who did protest during the last year and 0 for those who did not.
The best question to measure satisfaction in life in ABIII is (q102a) “Generally speaking, how would you
compare your living conditions with the rest of your fellow citizens?” The five options given are coded from
1, “much worse,” to 5, “much better.” WVS6, instead, provides question (v23) asking “All things considered,
how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?.” The scale for answers ranges from 1, “completely
dissatisfied,” to 10, “completely satisfied.” The relative deprivation theory assumes that people who feel de-
prived after comparing themselves to some other people are dissatisfied and start rebelling. Thus, questions
both from ABIII and WVS6 measure whether the respondent is relatively deprived in the sense of the theory.
There are two four-step questions both in ABIII (q404 and q405) and in WVS6 (v7 and v84) where respon-
dents rate their interest in politics. For both data sets, I have calculated the average of the two items. The scale
goes from 1.0 to 4.0: the more interest in politics the respondent has, the higher the value.
The control variables in each model are age, education level, gender, country of residence, and whether the
respondent lives in an urban or rural area. For binary logistic regression, education (question q1003 in ABIII,
v248 in WVS6) is coded on a four-step scale where 1 implies the lowest educational level and 4 the highest.
The “Age” variable equals simply the age of the respondent in years. Gender is coded as 1 for males and 0
for females. In most countries of ABIII, the respondents are coded as urban, 1, or rural, 0, based on question
(q13) which specifically asks this. For respondents from Kuwait this information is not available but 100.0% of
Kuwaitis live in urban areas (World Bank, 2019), so I have coded all Kuwaiti respondents as urban. In Palestine
“refugee camp” is available as a third option, Palestinians living in refugee camps are excluded from analyses. In
WVS6 respondents living in townswith a population greater than 10,000 are considered urban and respondents
living in towns smaller than that, rural (v253). Country is used as a control variablewhenmore than one country
is included in the sample. There is a separate binary variable for each country except for the country serving
as reference category. Even though these binary country variables are not reported in the tables, the country
variables are included in all analyses that study more than one country. In hypotheses 4 and 5 the results are
controlled for marital status (q1010, v57), those married are coded as 1 and all others as 0.
Descriptive statistcs, frequency tables and correlation matrices of the studied variables can be found
as appendices.
When respondents are asked about protesting and interests in politics, they might try to avoid answering
or answer dishonestly. This is a possible source of error. ABIII includes question (q513) asking how satisfied
respondents are with their government. If respondents would have been afraid of consequences, one could
expect good grades for governments in this question. However, on a scale from 0 to 10, the most common
answer has been zero: the respondent is absolutely unsatisfied with the government. About half, 52.1%, of
the respondents have evaluated their satisfaction to be lower than five, which is the median, and 29.1% have
considered themselves more satisfied than five. In addition, in this question the share of missing answers, 3.6%,
is relatively low and close to the share ofmissing answers for example in question (q701a) concerning tradewith
other countries, there 4.0% have failed to answer. The question about foreign trade could have had less missing
answers if many respondents had refused to answer in fear of state surveillance. These figures do not support
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suspicions of unwillingness to answer truthfully in fear of consequences. Last, there is no apparent reason why
this potential source of error would affect the unemployed and the employed differently.
4 Results
Figure 3 shows that, maybe not surprisingly, students weremost active in the Arab Spring uprisings, the retired
and the housewives the most passive. Therefore, it appears that employment status is linked to the likelihood
of protest participation. However, the difference between the unemployed and the employed seems marginal.
Figure 3: Protest participation by employment status.
Table 2: Binary logistic regression, hypothesis 1: protest participation of the unemployed.a
Explained variable Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting
Data set ABIII WVS6 ABIII WVS6 ABIII
Sample All
countries
All
countries
All
countries
All
countries
All
countries
Urban residence 0.231*** 0.237*** 0.185* 0.254*** 0.222***
(0.063) (0.070) (0.087) (0.085) (0.076)
Male 0.883*** 0.872*** 0.628*** 0.648*** 0.719***
(0.059) (0.066) (0.094) (0.089) (0.079)
Age –0.015*** –0.008*** –0.012*** –0.009** –0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
High education 0.315*** 0.337*** 0.309*** 0.278*** 0.266***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.040) (0.046) (0.035)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
 Employed –0.062 –0.179
(0.089) (0.112)
 Others –0.283*** –0.389***
(0.084) (0.103)
High income (absolute) 0.015 0.034
(0.014) (0.019)
High income (relative) 0.018
(0.036)
Constant –0.830*** –2.332*** –0.858*** –2.081*** –0.782***
(0.139) (0.191) (0.204) (0.234) (0.190)
N 14,173 9,331 6,011 5,149 7,844
R2 0.136 0.099 0.141 0.078 0.134
aIn Table 2, as in each table reporting results of binary logistic regression, the Cox and Snell r2 is reported.
Models controlled for country (not reported). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
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In the two leftmost analyses of Table 2, which utilise the employment status question, the results of the hy-
pothesis can be read from the “Employed” variable. According to both data sets the employedwere slightly less
active protesters than the unemployed, however, these differences are not statistically significant. This model
can be considered as the base model which will be modified when studying hypotheses 2 and 3. The three
rightmost analyses show the alternative measurements for unemployment, absolute and relative income. Here
the coefficients suggest that the higher the income, the higher the likelihood of an individual to take part in
protests. In the case of absolute income and WVS6 this relationship comes close to statistical significance (p =
0.071). Although the results in hypothesis 1 differ to some extent depending on which of the three measure-
ments of unemployment is used, the central finding is obvious. None of these analyses provides appreciable
support for the hypothesis that the unemployed would be more active protesters than the employed. Because
there are no great differences between the three operationalisations, the direct question of employment status
will be the only measure of unemployment used from now on.
Table 3 shows the results of the leftmost model of Table 2 in the subsamples of some countries and country
groups. When Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen are studied together, the employed are statistically signifi-
cantly more active in protesting than the unemployed. However, in the subsample of “other countries,” which
includes all countries except the four countries studied separately, the employed protest statistically signifi-
cantly less probably than the unemployed. If all these countries of the ABIII data were studied one by one, it
would turn out that the coefficients of five countries support the hypothesis, two of these countries suggest-
ing a statistically significant relationship, and seven countries contradict our assumption, one of these seven,
Libya, being statistically significant. The coefficients show that in some countries the difference between the
unemployed and the employed is notable, whereas in some countries, as in Tunisia, there are practically no
differences between these groups. Taken together, no unambiguous relationship appears between protest par-
ticipation and being unemployed.
Table 3: Binary logistic regression, hypothesis 1: protest participation of the unemployed by country.
Explained variable Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting
Data set ABIII ABIII ABIII ABIII ABIII ABIII
Sample Egypt Libya Tunisia Yemen Egypt, Libya, Tunisia,
and Yemen
Other
countries
Urban residence 0.753*** 0.412* 0.441* 0.289* 0.455*** –0.081
(0.187) (0.195) (0.184) (0.135) (0.084) (0.095)
Male 1.214*** 1.640*** 1.556*** 0.300* 1.090*** 0.626***
(0.228) (0.147) (0.196) (0.141) (0.081) (0.086)
Age –0.013 –0.006 –0.034*** –0.009 –0.016*** –0.012***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
High education 0.637*** 0.229*** 0.513*** 0.314*** 0.349*** 0.288***
(0.106) (0.080) (0.097) (0.063) (0.039) (0.047)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
 Employed 0.336 0.898*** 0.008 0.056 0.259* –0.331**
(0.356) (0.291) (0.229) (0.242) (0.129) (0.127)
 Others 0.085 0.579* 0.024 –0.429 –0.025 –0.488***
(0.373) (0.272) (0.221) (0.220) (0.122) (0.116)
Constant –4.747*** –3.147*** –2.738*** –0.658* –1.315*** –2.025***
(0.587) (0.508) (0.425) (0.335) (0.193) (0.191)
N 1,186 1,160 1,195 1,116 4,657 9,516
R2 0.122 0.154 0.153 0.084 0.166 0.040
Models analysing more than one country controlled for country (not reported). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in
parentheses.
To study hypothesis 2, I have run the base model of hypothesis 1 but included only respondents 18–35 years
old. Youth is defined following Bjorvatn and Høigilt (2016, p. 54), who argue that 35 years is an appropriate
upper limit for youth in the context of the Arab world. When studying hypothesis 3, I have run the model only
for respondents with higher than secondary education.
Table 4 shows that there is faintly more support among the Arab youth for hypothesis 2 than there is among
the all age population for hypothesis 1. Both data sets give a negative coefficient for the “Employed” variable,
as expected based on our hypotheses, and both results come closer to being statistically significant (p = 0.077,
p = 0.094). In turn, there is no considerable evidence that the educated unemployed would be more active
insurgents than the educated employed.
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Table 4: Binary logistic regression, hypotheses 2 and 3: protest participation of the unemployed among the youth and
among the educated.
Explained variable Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting
Data set ABIII WVS6 ABIII WVS6
Sample All countries, only
youth
All countries, only
youth
All countries, only
educated
All countries, only
educated
Urban residence 0.182* 0.282*** 0.139 0.245
(0.082) (0.094) (0.106) (0.127)
Male 0.927*** 0.900*** 1.207*** 0.864***
(0.078) (0.088) (0.101) (0.121)
Age –0.016* –0.017* –0.010* –0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
High education 0.325*** 0.330***
(0.042) (0.053)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
 Employed –0.198 –0.233 0.052 –0.182
(0.112) (0.140) (0.163) (0.207)
 Others –0.270** –0.436*** –0.061 –0.349
(0.098) (0.121) (0.163) (0.197)
Constant –0.844*** –2.045*** –0.051 –0.452
(0.243) (0.313) (0.243) (0.295)
N 7,072 4,707 3,984 2,123
R2 0.150 0.101 0.176 0.122
Models controlled for country (not reported). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
The results in Table 5 substantiate hypothesis 4, the unemployed are indeed statistically significantly less
satisfied. Compared to the unemployed, the employed are 0.2 or 0.8 units more satisfied on a scale of 1–5 of
the ABIII or 1–10 of the WVS6, respectively. The coefficients suggest that the unemployed are less interested in
politics than the employed, as assumed in hypothesis 5, but the difference between the groups is small. Neither
is the difference statistically significant, althoughwithWVS6 it comes close to statistical significance (p = 0.059).
Table 5: Linear regression, hypotheses 4 and 5: satisfaction with life and interest in politics of the unemployed.a
Explained variable Satisfaction with
life
Satisfaction with
life
Interest in politics Interest in politics
Data set ABIII WVS6 ABIII WVS6
Sample All countries All countries All countries All countries
Urban residence 0.067*** 0.010 0.017 –0.041*
(0.015) (0.054) (0.016) (0.020)
Male –0.046*** –0.264*** 0.193*** 0.124***
(0.014) (0.050) (0.015) (0.019)
Age –0.001 –0.006** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.023 0.251*** 0.091*** 0.090***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.017) (0.022)
High education 0.100*** 0.213*** 0.186*** 0.142***
(0.007) (0.029) (0.008) (0.011)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
 Employed 0.215*** 0.727*** 0.032 0.072
(0.024) (0.101) (0.026) (0.038)
 Others 0.135*** 0.855*** –0.120*** 0.031
(0.022) (0.091) (0.024) (0.035)
Constant 2.462*** 4.591*** 1.770*** 1.547***
(0.041) (0.153) (0.044) (0.058)
N 14,379 9,929 14,397 9,523
R2 0.041 0.072 0.156 0.124
aThe coefficients reported in Table 5 are unstandardized, and the coefficients of determination are adjusted.
Models controlled for country (not reported). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6 shows that, unlike what is assumed in hypothesis 6, satisfaction with life does not have an effect on
the likelihood of protest participation. By contrast, hypothesis 7 gets robust backing, those interested in politics
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are clearly more likely to protest. Further analyses in the two leftmost columns suggest that the slim interest in
politics of the unemployed is a factor lowering their participation in protests. In other words, when interest in
politics is added into the base model, being unemployed becomes a slightly stronger predictor of participation
in a protest. The changes are minor, but the same shift can be observed also when adding interest in politics to
the subsamples of Table 3; the coefficients of the Employed-variable move in the negative direction, and in case
the coefficients are negative their p-values decrease and in case the coefficients are positive they turn negative
or their p-values increase.
Table 6: Binary logistic regression, hypotheses 6 and 7: protest participation of the dissatisfied and the politically aware.
Explained
variable
Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting Protesting
Data set ABIII WVS6 ABIII WVS6 ABIII WVS6
Sample All countries All countries All countries All countries All countries All countries
Urban
residence
0.233*** 0.241*** 0.254*** 0.223*** 0.248*** 0.227***
(0.063) (0.070) (0.064) (0.071) (0.064) (0.072)
Male 0.964*** 0.916*** 0.882*** 0.934*** 0.835*** 0.883***
(0.057) (0.065) (0.058) (0.067) (0.060) (0.068)
Age –0.015*** –0.009*** –0.021*** –0.013*** –0.020*** –0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
High
education
0.325*** 0.362*** 0.232*** 0.301*** 0.230*** 0.288***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.029) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038)
Employment status (unemployed as reference category)
 Employed –0.097 –0.207
(0.091) (0.116)
 Others –0.230** –0.410***
(0.086) (0.106)
Satisfaction
with life
0.006 –0.001
(0.033) (0.013)
Interest in
politics
0.510*** 0.391*** 0.504*** 0.390***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036)
Constant –1.097*** –2.676*** –1.828*** –3.370*** –1.633*** –3.011***
(0.154) (0.189) (0.137) (0.191) (0.151) (0.207)
N 14,085 9,273 14,116 8,979 14,052 8,959
R2 0.137 0.097 0.152 0.110 0.152 0.112
Models controlled for country (not reported). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005. Standard errors in parentheses.
Control variables have shown that higher education increases the likelihood for protesting very clearly,
higher age reduces the likelihood for protesting almost as clearly, andmales are obviouslymore active protesters
than females. Results also indicate that those living in urban areas are generallymore likely to protest. Although
not reported, the country has been a control variable in all models where more than one country is analysed,
and in every one of these models, there have been considerable differences between countries.
4.1 Robustness of results
In addition to the results presented above a third data set, the second wave of the Arab Barometer (ABII),
has been used to test the hypotheses. I have also tested some changes and alternative operationalisations in the
models. I tested operationalising employment statuswith just a single variable which included the unemployed
(coded as 1) and the employed (0) but excluded respondents with any other employment status. I tested interac-
tion terms to study the young unemployed and the educated unemployed in hypotheses 2 and 3. In the models
with interaction terms, I operationalised employment status using this single variable which only compares the
employed and the unemployed and excludes all others. I then multiplied this binary variable with education
variable or age variable. I tested having 25 years as the upper limit for youth instead of 35 years used above in
hypothesis 2. I tested including the part-time employed in the analyses in addition to the full-time employed
and using voting as a measure for interest in politics instead of direct questions about political interest.
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Further, I tried addingmarital status, the number of children, ethnic group, and religion as control variables
to analyses modelling protest attendance. All these tested control variables were practically nowhere statisti-
cally significant, and adding them did not increase noteworthily the coefficients of determination nor change
the seeming impact of employment status. I have also run all the models presented in the article in the subsam-
ples introduced in Table 3.
Thus, in addition to those 25 separate regression analyses presented in Table 2–Table 6, the supplementary
material provides the results of altogether 314 regression analyses. The notions of the following chapters are
based on these supplementary analyses which are available as Supplementary material, which can be accessed
through the link at the end of the article.
In ABII, for Tunisia and for Egypt there are questions (EG802, EG812, T902, and T912) asking whether the
respondents participated in the Arab Spring protests prior to and after Ben Ali andMubarak relinquished their
power. In other countries, respondents are asked whether they during the past 3 years had participated “in a
protest, march or sit-in” (Q502.2).
To a great extent, results from the supplementary analyses detailed above – alternative operationalisations,
the ABII data set, and the aforementioned subsamples – are consistent with the results presented in the article.
Thus, the outcomes of all seven hypotheses can be considered robust.
Earlier I recognised that special attention must be given to how to measure unemployment status validly.
Three different operationalisations used, one based on the direct question of employment status and two using
income as a proxy for employment, all show parallelly that the unemployed are not more active protesters than
the employed. Arguably, the three ways of operationalising unemployment provide enough evidence to dispel
the concerns about flawed validity.
All these different data sets and different operationalisations provided scant support for the assumption of
the unemployed as active protesters. It seems that compared to the employed, the unemployed did not gen-
erally take to the streets more often in the Arab Spring uprisings or in other occasions in the studied Arab
countries. Mostly there are no clear differences between these two groups, and if there are differences, the
evidence suggests that the unemployed are rather less active protesters than the employed.
Interaction effects of employment status and other socio-economic and demographic features have not been
the focus of this article. The analyses carried out here do not rule out interaction effects. Still, if the young
unemployed or the highly educated unemployed hadmobilised especially actively andwidespreadly, it should
have become more visible in these tests.
The notion of the remote influence of unemployment becomes highlighted if unemployment is compared
with the control variables. Education, age, urban residence, and gender have all proved to be relatively strong
and statistically significant predictors of protest participation in almost every model and sample. The effect of
unemployment is, indeed, slender and controversial. Even if hypothesis 2 provided slightly more hint of the
assumed relationship between unemployment and participation in unrests than hypotheses 1 and 3, education
and gender were considerably more powerful predictors there, as well. The results also show that the same
variables have affected the participation of an individual in the Arab Spring revolts and in other protests of the
region.
As some Arab Spring protests involved violence andWVS6 in turn asks specifically about peaceful demon-
strations, WVS6 and ABIII do not measure exactly the same thing. The data sets however suggest that to a great
extent the same individual level traits have driven people to participate in both the Arab Spring protests and
peaceful demonstrations. In this paper, we are primarily interested in the Arab Spring so ABIII can be seen as
the principal data and the results fromWVS6 as strengthening the findings.
Table 3 indicated that there are differences between countries as to how the unemployed engage in protests.
I have run the base model (the leftmost model of Table 2) in all individual countries of all three data sets.
When combining results from different data sets and different operationalisations, there appear to be certain
countries where the unemployed are more active protesters than the employedwhereas in most countries there
are no such differences, or the unemployed are less active than the employed. As Table 3 already hinted, further
analysis supports the idea of Libya as a country where the unemployed are less active protesters than the
employed. In Algeria, on the other hand, all three data sets show that the Algerian unemployed are more active
protesters than their employed countrymen.
There is an issue with validity in hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 which can be called time lag. In ABIII respon-
dents are in practice asked whether they took part in the Arab Spring uprisings up to three and a half years
ago, and inWVS6 whether they protested during the preceding year. In ABII respondents in Tunisia and Egypt
were asked whether they participated in the Arab Spring uprisings which at the time of the survey had be-
gun 6–10 months earlier. So, in practice, I have modelled the impact of the respondents’ employment status
and other socio-economic characteristics at the time of the survey on the respondents’ protest participation
even years earlier. During 6 months or 1 year, there are obviously less changes in employment status and other
features compared to changes during several years. Consequently, if time lag would considerably disturb the
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analyses, there should be more support for hypotheses from data where the time between the protests and the
survey is shorter. This is not the case. Further, the above-mentioned differences between countries in protest
participation of the unemployed indicate a minor effect of time lag.
As noted earlier, in hypotheses 4 and 5 it is debatable to what extent using Likert scale variables and non-
normally distributed explained variables reduces the accuracy of the analyses. However, concerning both time
lag and the above-mentioned considerations in linear regression, the slight inaccuracies they caused should not
be considered to invalidate results which are as robust and concordant as these.
Throughout all my models the coefficients of determination remain low. This is expected as protesting,
satisfaction with life, and interest in politics are phenomena influenced by a lot of contingency. The explanatory
power of the regression analyses does not lie in any single model or its coefficient of determination but instead
in the abundance of survey data, in the number of the models, and the highly similar results they indicate.
4.2 Comparisonswith earlier research
The results of all hypotheses are summarised in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Findings of the hypotheses.
The arrows in the figure indicate assumed relationships, and the colours of the arrows tell whether the
results suggested a positive relationship (blue) or no relationship at all (blank). None of the relationships pre-
sented in the figure was predominantly negative. The figure partly generalises the results but in short, my
analyses show that the likelihood of the unemployed of taking to the streets is not higher (arrow 1) despite the
fact that they are more dissatisfied (arrow 2). Further, this passivity of the unemployed can be partly explained
with the finding that, in general, dissatisfaction with life does not increase the likelihood of protesting (arrow
3). Being interested in politics then again increases the likelihood of protesting (arrow 4). But the unemployed
are rather less interested in politics (arrow 5), andmy results hint that this lessens their participation in protests.
On the other hand, one should not make too bold claims about causality on the basis of this article. For
example, it might be that individual-level personality traits, such as being enterprising or sociable person,
make people both politically active and employed. It seems more plausible to think that interest in politics
drives people to participate in protests than the other way around, i.e. that participating in protests would
make people interested in politics. On the other hand, while being unemployed can arguably make people
dissatisfied with life, being dissatisfied might also make it harder to get a job. But even we cannot be sure about
causalities between the different factors, this does not change the core results that the unemployed are unhappy
but relatively passive protesters compared to the employed. After all, it perhaps seems understandable that the
unemployed were less eager to take part in the Arab Spring protests. Maybe people who have problems in
feeding themselves are not so interested in whether the country is governed democratically or not.
Earlier literature has emphasised the important role labour unions often play in the mobilisation of the
unemployed and the differences between countries in how labour unions take the jobless into consideration
(Chabanet & Faniel, 2011, pp. 398–404; Klandermans, 2011, p. 45). This might offer one explanation for the
suggestive result that the unemployedweremore passive in someArab countries than in others. Langhor (2014)
has found that countries differed considerably as to which role the labour unions took in the Arab Spring
uprisings.
Until now we have traced the relationship between unemployment and political instability by observing
whether the unemployed have been active rebels compared to the employed. But people who are not unem-
ployed themselves can take political action concerning unemployment (Schlozman & Verba, 1979, p. 20). This
can happen because of solidarity or because of a large number of unemployed makes those who are working
concerned about their own future. The employed and unemployed are connected through social networks.
They can also live in the same households.
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In Tunisia the most chanted slogan of the Arab Spring protesters is said to have been “Employment, free-
dom, and dignity” (Ben Mhenni, 2014). Soon after the uprising had toppled Tunisia’s former ruler Ben Ali, a
survey found that 60% regarded unemployment as the biggest or second biggest problem facing the country
(International Republican Institute, 2011). Thus, it seems that people brought out their frustration with unem-
ployment, even though in Tunisia the unemployment rate had rather steadily decreased during the decades
before the Arab Spring (World Bank, 2019). Arampatzi, Burger, Ianchovichina, Röhricht, and Veenhoven (2018)
have demonstrated that as a whole there were substantial improvements in economic and social indicators
throughout the Middle East and North Africa region during the decades preceding the Arab Spring. But si-
multaneously, in the years before the Arab Spring people had become increasingly less satisfied with their
lives. Arampatzi et al. identify this as the “unhappy development” paradox.
We know now that the unemployed were not more likely to revolt and that in most Arab countries the
unemployment rates decreased or remained steady in the decade preceding the Arab Spring (World Bank,
2019). It also seems that people can be dissatisfied with the employment situation even if the unemployment
rate has decreased. People who are not unemployed themselves might riot because of unemployment. But on
the other hand, those who are less satisfied are not more likely to protest. The results of this study should not
be interpreted as a proof that unemployment was irrelevant for the Arab Spring. Still, the results give us a
strong reason to question whether unemployment was as important a factor in this chain of events as many
have suggested.
5 Conclusion
It is important to study the significance of unemployment for political instability to get a better understanding
of the mechanisms behind rebellions, but also to provide guidance for policies aiming at preventing political
instability.
This study found that compared to the employed, the unemployed generally were no more likely to partic-
ipate in the Arab Spring uprisings or some other protests of the region. This outcome is robust and all three
different ways used to operationalise unemployment support it. Unlike what was hypothesised, in several cases
it turned out that the unemployed actually are less likely to protest than the employed. The results suggest that,
due to their low interest in politics, the dissatisfaction of the unemployed probably does not erupt as rioting.
Theoretical considerations also provide other possible explanations for why the unemployed do not take ac-
tion. This might be due to the fact that they, for example, lack social networks, are marginalised or believe that
rebelling is unlikely to bring them jobs. Taken together, although my results do not provide a complete picture,
all the results of the study form a logical whole, where one part supports the other.
The results show clearly and consistently that being younger and being more educated are, as expected,
factors which increase the likelihood of an individual to protest. This finding further underlines the slight and
controversial effect of being unemployed.
Earlier research studying other countries indicates that unemployment is not a strong causal factor predict-
ing political instability at an individual or country or region level. The key result of this study is in line with this
finding; neither does unemployment seem to have been a major driving force behind the Arab Spring. Against
the background of earlier research this result might seem expected, but taken into account the numerous as-
sumptions about the linkage of the Arab Spring and unemployment, these findings are rather surprising.
There are – as far as I know – no prior studies which would have focused on the role of the unemployed
in the revolts of the Arab Spring. So first, this study has shed more light on the net of drivers behind the Arab
Spring. Second, this study is novel in the thoroughness withwhich it examines the role of unemployment in the
protests of the Arab countries more generally. But in addition, neither has the significance of unemployment for
protest movements and rebellions globally been studied too much. This study is one new case study to increase
our knowledge in this field.
It is not advisable tomake, based on these results, country-specific assumptions about the passivity or activ-
ity of the unemployed elsewhere. One indicative result of this study is that there are considerable differences
between countries in how unemployment influences the protest engagement of individuals. Thus one direc-
tion for future research would be to explore whether the differences really are country specific. And if country-
specific differences do exist, could they at least partly explain contradictory results of earlier research in relation
to unemployment and political instability? And further, what causes these differences between countries in the
first place?
On the other hand, something from all this could be generalised. Namely, based on both my results and
earlier studies, the significance of unemployment as a driver of political instability generally appears to be
weaker andmore complex than is often assumed.As to policy recommendations, this study joins those previous
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analyses which suggest that programmes aiming at fostering peace solely through creating jobs are likely to
miss their target.
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AppendixA
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of ABIII.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Employment status: unemployed†
(unemployed = 1; Employed = 0)
6,286 0 1 0.28 0.449
Employment status: employed (employed = 1;
unemployed & others = 0)
14,729 0 1 0.31 0.461
Employment status: others (others = 1;
employed & unemployed = 0)
14,729 0 1 0.57 0.495
High income (absolute) 9,974 1 10 5.01 3.083
High income (relative) 14,417 1 4 2.27 0.948
Urban residence 14,648 0 1 0.67 0.470
Male 14,809 0 1 0.50 0.500
Age 14,799 18 89 37.80 13.886
High education 14,775 1 4 2.63 1.042
Married 14,795 0 1 0.64 0.481
Protest participation 14,427 0 1 0.14 0.345
Satisfied with life 14,649 1 5 2.96 0.805
Interest in politics 14,662 1.0 4.0 2.42 0.921
†This variable has not been used in the regression analyses reported in the article, it is here to illustrate correlations between
unemployment and other variables. Other respondents than the unemployed and the employed are excluded in this variable.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of WVS6.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Employment status: unemployed†
(unemployed = 1; employed = 0)
3,172 0 1 0.28 0.447
Employment status: employed (employed = 1;
unemployed & others = 0)
10,307 0 1 0.22 0.416
Employment status: others (others = 1;
employed & unemployed = 0)
10,307 0 1 0.69 0.462
High income (absolute) 10,021 1 10 4.89 2.150
Urban residence 10,101 0 1 0.57 0.496
Male 10,336 0 1 0.51 0.500
Age 10,336 18 90 37.93 14.439
High education 10,296 1 4 2.62 1.033
Married 10,334 0 1 0.60 0.491
16
Au
tom
ati
ca
lly
ge
ne
rat
ed
ro
ug
hP
DF
by
Pr
oo
fCh
eck
fro
m
Riv
er
Va
lle
yT
ec
hn
olo
gie
sL
td
DEGRUYTER Paasonen
Protest participation 9,595 0 1 0.15 0.359
Satisfied with life 10,218 1 10 6.35 2.481
Interest in politics 9,796 1.0 4.0 2.31 0.948
†This variable has not been used in the regression analyses reported in the article, it is here to illustrate correlations between
unemployment and other variables. Other respondents than the unemployed and the employed are excluded in this variable.
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Figure 5: Frequency tables of the main variables.
AppendixB
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